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Thomas Pynchon ranks among the most critically acclaimed American authors of the past fifty
years; certainly so when viewed in terms of academic scholarship. He has two academic journals
devoted solely to his work and influence, over twenty monographs exploring his writing and, since
1978, there have been  23 doctorates awarded in the United Kingdom alone on, or in major part
concerning, his fiction. This trend shows no sign of stopping; with apologies to the well-known
formulation  of  James  Joyce,  almost  a  century  ago,  it  seems as  though Thomas  Pynchon will
continue to keep the professors busy.
The reasons for this critical proliferation are not hard to fathom. Pynchon is a man of mystery, 
refusing to be photographed or interviewed, who has published some of the finest works of post-war
literature, particularly V., Gravity’s Rainbow, The Crying of Lot 49 and Mason & Dixon. His novels 
have most frequently been type-cast as exemplary of the postmodern – saturated as they are with 
paranoia, indeterminacy and failed quest-narratives – but this seriously underplays the scale of 
Pynchon’s writing. Consider that Pynchon is also a writer of enormous historical scope. V. spans the
defining moments of crisis in the twentieth century, Gravity’s Rainbow re-casts the sixties in terms 
of World War II and the history of Calvinism (including a flashback to a Mauritian Dodo hunt) 
while Mason & Dixon explores the interrelation of its eponymous protagonists with the Age of 
Reason and slavery in America. If this weren’t enough, his novels are interdisciplinary, 
incorporating metaphors from science and technology, cartography, popular culture, cartoons, aural 
puns, mathematical in-jokes, outrageous character names (and sexual practices) and sublime prose 
poetry.
More important than any of these preceding aspects, though, is the fact that Pynchon is a 
politically engaged, ethical writer. Gravity’s Rainbow 
[SLIDE]
the novel upon which I will focus today, is not just a dense, postmodern sprawl, but instead makes 
one of its central observations on the fact that the evil of mankind, parallel to nature, “does not 
know extinction; all it knows is transformation”, a spatio-temporal transposition to a new setting, 
persisting Beyond the Zero of any Pavlovian deconditioning, and always collecting around centres 
of power, embodied by the novel’s final, America-bound, transatlantic V-2/ICBM. Through this 
impossible moment, Pynchon highlights that behind twentieth-century America’s technological and 
economic supremacy lies the dark negotiations of Operation Paperclip and a re-embodiment of the 
right-wing politics supposedly vanquished in the Second World War. How many of us notice, 
inscribed upon our antibiotics, the second label, permanently hidden beneath the surface-level, 
reading “sulfonamide” and “I.G. Farben”? How many of us see, when we watch satellite television, 
the German technician crying: “Vergeltungswaffe”?
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This mammoth novel, in common with  Mason & Dixon,  Against the Day, V.,  Vineland  and  The
Crying  of  Lot  49, plots  the  webs  of  global  conspiracy  and  power  that  lurk  behind  everyday
appearance; it unmasks, it shows the deception of perception. Thus, uniting both the California and
the epic cycles of Pynchon's work has been a tacit critical acceptance that Pynchon sits firmly in the
idealist tradition, particularly those forms of subjective idealism that query the accessibility of the
beyond.
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As  David  Cowart  puts  it:  Pynchon's  writing  is  preoccupied  with  “challenging  and  subverting
materialist complacency”.
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However, since 2008, Pynchon criticism has belatedly found a route into the thinkers of the
Frankfurt  School through the work of Sam Thomas whose  Pynchon and the Political  plots the
instances  of  micro-utopia  in  Pynchon's  fiction  through  an  Adornian  methodology,  those  small
moments  of  isolated  hope,  the  one-time,  unrepeatable  but  marginalised  instances  of  immanent
utopia. My own subsequent investigations into this route have yielded some strange inconsistencies
with the history of idealism that has been presented. Does Pynchon's stance really transform objects
in this way? Is his really subjective idealism or is it possible to enact a revisionist account, even at
the fortieth anniversary of  Gravity's Rainbow,  that subverts, or at  least tones down this idealist
rhetoric? It is to this task that I address this paper through a unique reading of Pynchon alongside
Theodor  W.  Adorno,  for  the  objects  that  are  really  transformed  here  are  not  private,  in
Wittgenstein's sense, they do not “drop out of consideration”, they are rather the public objects of
Pynchon's politics.
Before  proceeding,  then,  I  want  to  outline  some basic  aspects  of  terminology,  the  very
process of which will unavoidably do violence to Adorno's thought, but necessarily so in order to
undertake any theoretical consideration. As Pynchon puts it in Gravity's Rainbow: “by the time you
get any summary, the whole thing'll have changed. We could shorten them for you as much as you
like, but you'd be losing so much resolution, it wouldn't be worth it” (540-541). 
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Adorno's  conception  of  the  purpose,  or  task,  of  philosophy,  then,  is  most  clearly  and
succinctly outlined in the piece, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, his 1931 inaugural lecture at the
University  of  Frankfurt.  In  this  lecture,  Adorno  called  for  a  conflation,  but  at  the  same time,
separation of philosophy and science. Critiquing both phenomenology for its ontological fixation,
resulting  in  a  reason  that  attempts  to  coerce  nature  into  its  own  structures  (23)  and  logical
positivism under which “philosophy becomes solely an occasion for ordering and controlling the
separate sciences,” Adorno suggests that the question faced by philosophy is whether “there exists
an adequacy between the philosophic questions and the possibility of their being answered at all”
(29). Adorno believes that philosophy has been asking the wrong questions.
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The questions that should be asked and the way they could be answered came instead from a
concept put forward by Walter Benjamin in the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” to his Trauerspiel
study, the constellation: “'[I]deas are not represented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in an
arrangement of concrete elements in the concept: as the configuration of these elements [...] Ideas
are to objects as constellations are to stars” (The Origin of German Tragic Drama 34). Adorno
concludes that the proper activity for philosophy is a form of configurational permutation, stating
that  “philosophy has  to  bring  its  elements,  which  it  receives  from the  sciences,  into  changing
constellations [...] into changing trial combinations, until they fall into a figure which can be read as
an answer” (“The Actuality of Philosophy” 32). 
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With a justification for a theoretical approach put aside, Adorno reveals what is meant by the
term negative dialectics. Negative dialectics, to state it precisely but in a way that requires further
explication, is the primacy of the object. To explore this, it is necessary to trace Adorno's argument.
As a subject thinks, he or she conceives of an equality between the concept in the subject's mind,
and the reality which is subsumed under that concept: “To think is to identify”, or from Hegel:
“Judgment joins subject and object in a connection of identity” (The Science of Logic sec 21.78).
However, for Adorno, the inherent imperfection of the concept means that reality is always more
than the concept can hold: “objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder” (ND
5). This remainder is the part of reality that makes it non-identical with a mental concept. Adorno
sees, therefore, that in the usual mode of thinking, the subject is given priority as those aspects of
reality  that  don't  fit  with  the  subject's  concept  “will  be  reduced to  the  merely  logical  form of
contradiction” (ND 5). To give the object primacy is to respect the unique, rather than to dominate
through identity thinking or exclude through contradiction.
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To assess the mainstream against which this  paper sets itself,  and to return to Pynchon,
consider that, alongside Cowart, Douglas Fowler writes extensively, albeit unconvincingly, on the
“clash between this world and [...] The Other Kingdom” (10), asserting that “more than any other
single effect, supernatural terror is what Pynchon works to convey” (13). Gravity's Rainbow itself,
as with much of Pynchon's  fiction,  is  saturated with paranormal occurrences,  from its  multiple
séances  to  The White  Visitation and passages  on the “Region of  Uncertainty”  at  the  centre  of
“Subimipolexity” (700). While one initial retort might be to challenge this on the basis that the
perception and cognition of idealism differ from spiritual and supernatural structures, there has been
much commentary to undermine such a response. Indeed, this is most marked in the writings of
Lenin  who  refers  to  philosophical  idealism as  a  “road  to  clerical  obscurantism”  (14),  a  view
furthered by Maurice Cornforth's declaration that “[a]t bottom, idealism is religion, theology” (20).
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However, three core aspects of this initial foin against Pynchon's materialism can be parried
at the outset. The first is that the appearance of paranormal belief systems is consistent with the
generic mediation of the novel's setting; as Brian McHale has recently observed, Pynchon's novels
from 1973 onwards seem to appropriate  the generic  of the era  in which they are set  and also,
therefore, the thematic content, a strategy he terms “mediated historiography” (25): “If Against the
Day is a library of early-twentieth-century entertainment fiction, then Gravity's Rainbow is a media
library of the 1940s” (21). The appearance of séances in conjunction with a detective/mystery setup
(combining two Pynchonian strands) would be consistent, then, with the films of the era such as
The Hound of the Baskervilles (1939), Pillow of Death (1945) and The Phantom Thief (1946),
which all feature mediated communication with the dead, to name but three examples (Backer 56–
57,  164–165,  257–259).  As with  the  character  Felipe  in  Gravity's  Rainbow,  Pynchon could  be
merely “using a bit of movie language” (GR 612).
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The second basic refutation of an idealist Pynchon hinges on the accessibility of Pynchon's
beyond.  For  a  transcendental  idealism  to  hold,  the  thing-in-itself  must  be  inaccessible  and
unknowable except through appearance. This door swings both ways in Gravity's Rainbow for the
very purpose of a séance is to experience the beyond, but it is generally through a medium that
shapes cognition of the other side into acceptable forms, as with the subjective aspects of Kant's
idealism. This is not always the case though, for as Cowart highlights, several of Slothrop's dreams
“feature contact or near contact with the dead (The Art of Allusion 50). For Cowart, the status of the
oneiric as a knowledge construct is dubious as it is “linked to the ontological and epistemological
importance of movies in the novel” (The Art of Allusion 51) and leads to the conclusion of a gnostic
Pynchon, as with Eddins (The Art of Allusion 61). However, dreams and séances are not the only
encounters with the dead. For many, in Pynchon's depiction of the concentration camp Dora, death
came as the liberating equivalent of the American Army, in the realm of the soul and they are now
on the “spiritual rampage”. To fend off these ghouls it is suggested that one can “[u]se the natural
balance  of  your  mind  against  them” (296).  In  this  instance  it  appears  that  the  mechanisms of
perceptual concepts that permit understanding can be used to isolate the invading thing-in-itself and
banish the phenomenon to the realm of the noumenon. Nevertheless, it seems that the spiritual must
have, in the first instance, crossed the perceptual divide and entered the realm of the material even
when “certain messages don't always 'make sense' back here” (GR 624).
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The third perspective that assaults a Pynchon-against-materialism comes from Jeff Baker
whose excellent work on Pynchon's politics traces the pragmatist association of the idealist tradition
with right-wing Nazi ideology in Dewey, Kedward and Westbrook (327). Obviously, this critique is
pertinent in an Adornian context, for other sinister components of the idealist tradition seem also to
filter  back into  the  text;  consider,  for  instance,  Slothrop's  horrific  dream in  Gravity's  Rainbow
wherein he has found “a very old dictionary” and, as it falls open to the page containing the entry
“JAMF”,  the  name  of  his,  perhaps  non-existent,  experimental  persecutor,  he  finds  that  “[t]he
definition would read: I” (287). Idealism, in both transcendental and absolute forms, comes under
heavy political  critique in  Gravity's  Rainbow, but it  always worth remembering the comforting
words of Enzian to Katje: “[n]one of it may look real, but some of it is. Really” (659).
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Three  suggestions,  then,  that  Pynchon  may,  for  ethico-political  reasons,  depict,  but  still
condemn an idealist system. But how do these play out within the text itself? Beginning to think
about Gravity's Rainbow in light of Adorno's Negative Dialectics allows a consideration of the issue
of cyclicality in the novel and to examine Blicero's sacrificial launch (in which he places his young
lover inside a custom-crafted V2) as a moment that pits the idealist and materialist traditions against
one another while also mounting a critique of positivist dialectics itself. To trace this, it is necessary
to aggregate the moments of comment upon sacrifice and absolutism that occur in the novel, the
foremost of which takes place in the first extended commentary upon the Zone Herero (314-329).
The conversation between Josef Ombindi and Enzian at this point turns upon a guessing
game to identify an act that “you ordinarily wouldn't think of as erotic – but it's really the most
erotic thing there is”. The first clue offered in this game of twenty questions is that “It's a non-
repeatable act”  which must necessarily  exclude firing a rocket  because “there's  always another
rocket” (319). This clearly ties in with the Herero's plan to launch the second such rocket. However,
the second, and final clue – that the answer “embraces all of the Deviations in one single act” –
leads to the conclusion that the phenomenon of which they speak “is the act of suicide”.
Blicero's launch of his rocket can be seen, in the light of this unfolding, as the point of
attempted  synthesis  between  several  strands  inherent  in  the  Zone  Herero  passage,  an  act
subsequently  repeated  by  Enzian's  Revolutionaries  of  the  Zero.  The  first,  most  obvious,
thesis/antithesis  pairing  fused  in  this  moment  is  Gottfried's  willing  complicity  (unrepeatable
suicide) with a rocket launch (cyclicality). In this respect, the synthesis approaches one-timeness
through repetition. Secondly, Pynchon's rocket synthesis fuses the differing factions of the Herero
into the unified goal of the prevailing System, perhaps best seen in the 00001. At once, the utopian
specificity of the event exhibits identity with the smothering master concept. Finally, and critically
most  well  known,  Blicero's  and Enzian's  launches  fuse  autonomy with loss  of  agency.  Blicero
believes, for instance, that the Rocket is the key to “understand truly his manhood” which is an
active undertaking “won, away from the feminine darkness” but is simultaneously a submission;
“demanded, in his own case, that he enter the service of the Rocket” (324). For Enzian, asserting his
agency in “schemes, expediting, newly invented paperwork”, it is also a loss as his act is a mere
secondary repetition, a repetition that must end with the one-timeness of tribal death (318). Finally,
for Gottfried, who sits at the centre of the synthesis, his dialectic encounters two cross-woven axes,
for his is the part of the masochist, the one who acts by surrendering his ability to act while, on the
y-coordinate, as he is all too aware:
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 “This ascent will be betrayed to Gravity. But the Rocket engine, the deep cry of combustion which
jars the soul, promises escape. The victim, in bondage to falling, rises on a promise, a prophecy, of
Escape...” (758)
These failed attempted syntheses of contradictions, across each element of Adornian Utopia,
into single subjects, acts and events are, as Adorno puts it, “not due to faulty subjective thinking”
(ND 151). Instead, the idealist “act of synthesis […] indicates that it  shall not be otherwise”, it
closes down the possibility  of  difference,  the Utopian,  as  “[t]he will  to  identify works in  each
synthesis” (ND 148). The will, in each of these cases, is to subsume the opposite, to eradicate the
contradiction, to make reality conform to reason's domination and thereby escape. As has been seen,
though, under this schema repetition drags one-timeness back, the group subsumes the marginal and
gravity brings down escape. Blicero's attempted mastery of the world, in order to transcend it, can
be seen to work in much the same way as Adorno's framing of idealist dialectics. In Pynchon's
fictional  world,  positivity  is  continually thwarted and it  is,  instead,  an unfruitful,  yet necessary
negativity, that must continually undercut that is placed at centre stage.
This reading gains further weight because it  helps to account for a different moment of
attempted  transcendence achieving a  different  status.  Consider  that  Geli  Tripping's  magic,  with
which she bewitches Tchitcherine near the novel's close, does not take two incompatible ends of a
loaf and join them, but rather “breaks a piece of the magic bread in half”; moving from the concept
to  the  specific  (734).  Indeed,  it  is  made  clear  that  the  “[y]oung  Tchitcherine”  views  “Marxist
dialectics” as “the antidote ” – a determined synthetic, aggressive dance of collision and subsuming
annihilation  –  but  that  he  also  appreciates  that  his  allegiance  to  such  a  fusion  will  only  be
determined  at  “the  point  of  decision”  (701).  Reading  this  passage  in  light  of  Tchitcherine's
subsequent turn away from the place Pynchon earlier describes as that
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 “[w]here  ideas  of  the  opposite  have  come together,  and lost  their  oppositeness”  leads  to  two
conclusions  (50).  Firstly,  Pynchon  does  not  critique  materialism  solely  through  a  paralysing
idealism. Instead, his criticism is, at points, immanently materialist. Secondly, it is possible to see a
kinship  with  Adornian  negativity  that  separates  Tchitcherine's  and  Blicero's  respective
“redemptions”.  Blicero's  moment  of  closing  possibilities  attempts  to  cross  the  final  edge,
mistakenly believing this  moment to  be freedom. As Achtfaden's  narrative passage in  Gravity's
Rainbow observes: 
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You follow the edge of the storm, with another sense – the flight-sense, located nowhere,
filling all your nerves... as long as you stay always right at the edge between fair lowlands
and the madness of Donar it does not fail you, whatever it is that flies, this carrying drive
toward – is it freedom? (455)
Tchitcherine's “personal doom” is “always to be held at the edges of revelations,” but it
seems this is also his personal salvation (566). Transcendence, when viewed in terms of dialectical
progress, both idealist and materialist, is not a positive goal in Gravity's Rainbow; one must instead
remain forever moving in terms of negative critique, allowing thought to continually unthink itself,
process  not  progress.  This  persistent  negativity  explains  Roger's  notion  of  persistence  in  his
“ineffectual” counterforce tirade:
[SLIDE]
What you get, I'll take. If you go higher in this, I'll come and get you, and take you back
down.  Wherever  you  go.  Even  should  you  find  a  spare  moment  of  rest,  with  an
understanding woman in a quiet room, I'll be at the window. I'll always be just outside. You
will never cancel me. (636-637)
Yes, Tchitcherine goes to the edge,  his “edge of the evening” where he “has passed his
brother by” (735). He does not however, cross-over; he does not wish on the “star between his feet”
for escape (759). He remains immanent. Blicero conversely, at his own “edge of the evening” can
look only upwards, beyond the event horizon, drawn towards a the positivity from which no light
would escape, which he knows goes on and he lets go on, for “the true moment of shadow is the
moment in which you see the point of light in the sky. The single point, and the Shadow that has
just gathered you in its sweep...” (759) This is not to say that immanence guarantees success. There
remains the possibility, in Gravity's Rainbow, for utopian critique to be of no value whatsoever, a
determinate negation that overlays only the same: “[a]nother world laid down on the previous one
and to all  appearances  no different”  (644).  It  is  here,  though,  in  parallel  to  Adorno's  Negative
Dialectics – a work that resonates strongly with Gravity's Rainbow – that Tchitcherine's redemption
can best be framed. Amid collapses all round – “[e]ach day the mythical return Enzian dreamed of
seems  less  possible”  (519)  –  across  the  myriad  of  contradictions,  conceptual  aporias  and
classificatory attempts, it all boiled down to a single pair of words that encapsulate Pynchon's stab
at positivity, resolution and self-content dialectics and which help to demonstrate why the Frankfurt
School merit recognition in relation to his writing. Tchitcherine remains at his edge in a cyclical
eternity. For while it can syntactically be read in reference to the many instances of passing one's
brother  by,  the  juxtaposition  creates  a  sense of  temporal  strangeness,  of  cross-cutting  markers.
Indeed, as with the recurrent critique made by Roger Mexico, never to be displaced, he remains
there (he remains here)
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 “often forever” (735).
